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Thoughts on the Market

Morgan Stanley
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  • Thoughts on the Market

    2027 Global Outlook: Powered by AI, Tested by Oil

    16.11.2026 | 13 min.
    In part one of our 2027 global macro outlook, Global Chief Economist Seth Carpenter joins Serena Tang to discuss how AI-driven investment is sustaining growth despite higher oil prices.
    Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.

    ----- Transcript -----

    Serena Tang: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Serena Tang, Morgan Stanley's Global Cross-Asset Strategist.
    Seth Carpenter: And I'm Seth Carpenter, Morgan Stanley's Global Chief Economist and Head of Macro Research.
    Serena Tang: Today and tomorrow, a two-part conversation on Morgan Stanley's year ahead outlook.
    Today, we'll focus on the global economy after a year of energy shocks and renewed inflation pressure. Tomorrow, we'll be back with our views on investing across asset classes.
    It's Monday, November 16th at 10:00 AM in New York.
    So Seth, let's start with the big picture. It's been a challenging year to map the global economy with the war in Iran, shifting trade policies, and more recently, US midterms, adding uncertainty even as AI investment supports growth. As you look ahead to 2027, what's a story that ties it all together, and where do you see the global economy heading?
    Seth Carpenter: Sure. I mean, the interesting thing I think so far might be a bit of a surprise, to date, about how, dare I use the word that's been overused a little bit, how resilient global growth has been.
    We've had a whole series of shocks. We've had the energy price shock. Last year, we had tariffs. We've seen now developed market central banks starting to raise rates, and yet overall growth is holding up. And so we've titled the outlook this time, Powered by AI, Tested by Oil, because there really is this underlying momentum that's going on that is about this whole AI phenomenon.
    In the United States, the build-out, the CapEx infrastructure spending is clearly strong, and it's one of the key drivers of US growth. But it's a global theme because Asia, where the world supply chain in many ways is located, is getting a lot of growth by exporting components for this build-out. Europe is actually getting into the game there a little bit as well, and Japan has been part of it.
    So this AI phenomenon, that's global, and that's a big part of what's sustaining growth. But oil prices have gone up dramatically since the US invasion of Iran, and so we have to ask ourselves, what is going on with inflation? We've seen, headline inflation globally go up. We know that the spread of refined products over crude is higher than usual, so that risks more inflationary pressure coming through later.
    And so we've seen central banks hiking in response. So the question becomes then, can this underlying momentum overcome the adverse shocks that we're seeing? I'd say our view is, yeah, probably. 2027 might see a little bit of a lull, a little bit of a slower pace initially, but that's not because we think we're actually going to have a real slowdown in the global economy.
    It's just the growth rate this year is pretty strong. It's gonna be hard to top that regardless of what's going on.
    To take that narrative and just to summarize it, to put it in numbers, to make it easier to digest, this year, global real GDP, we think, is tracking at about three and a half percent, so 3.5%. Next year, that little bit of a lull that I talked about would bring it down to something like 3.3% before rebounding in twenty twenty-eight to about 3.4%.
    Now, that doesn't sound like a huge swing, and ultimately, we don't think it is. We are constructive about the growth rate of the global economy. But these little swings, especially when you think about it at a global level, can start to matter, and investors are gonna look at the data as they come in.
    Serena Tang: So you've given us the picture at the aggregate level. I actually want to dig a little bit more into the regional views. Where do you see faster growth? Where do you see slower growth? And what does inflation look like globally?
    Seth Carpenter: Yeah, those are key questions, and I think all of the conversations that I have with investors really touch on that. So I would say, first off, the US is clearly a key driver here, right?
    So the AI CapEx build-out is absolutely taking place in the biggest part in the United States. And there we're looking for growth, call it two and a half percent this year. So by US standards, that's really strong growth numbers. Inflation, we think, is gonna stay high here as well.
    We've seen the energy price shock feeding through. We know that the statistical agencies often have a little bit of what we call residual seasonality in the inflation data in the beginning of the year. And so we suspect that we're still gonna see a few more months of high inflation data. But if our forecast is right, and this is a critical if, if our forecast is right, Q1 will be the peak of inflation, and then we'll see it start to trend down in the United States because we do think growth remains solid.
    But so far, we don't really see overheating going on in the labor market. Now, across the Atlantic in Europe, we're also pretty constructive. So a growth rate of around one point three percent or so this year, of real GDP growth.
    It's much less fast than what we're seeing in the United States, but nevertheless, it's holding up. That's being driven by a little bit of extra exports to the US, but fiscal policy clearly in Germany still supporting things, and the periphery is holding up in terms of overall demand.
    Inflation there feels a lot like inflation in the United States. However, the economy is much more susceptible to inflation energy price shocks. And so that's why the ECB started hiking before the Fed did.
    We think there's probably another hike there. We also expect inflation there to drift down over time, but it's gonna take a while, and the divergence between the headline inflation numbers and the core inflation numbers might actually be a bit bigger in Europe than elsewhere.
    Now, Asia. Asia's a really interesting story, and we're used to thinking of China as the other big economy in the world. And that's true, but their growth right now is on the tepid side by Chinese standards. We expect that to continue because they're still working through this debt deflation cycle.
    And so four point three percent or so, growth next year is about what we're looking for. We do think that deflation's going to ebb, but not anytime soon. That outcome is in contrast to the rest of Asia, especially take Korea, Taiwan, the real exporting houses for this whole AI CapEx build-out phenomenon.
    Again, growth rates are gonna tell you a different story because the spending has been rising so rapidly now. We expect exports to stay very strong there. But in growth rate terms, it might actually come off, not because things are fundamentally weakening, but because you just can't keep that same pace of exporting going.
    Serena Tang: So you touched on this earlier already, but as we know, inflation this year has driven a lot of debate around the Fed path. So what are you expecting for 2027?
    Seth Carpenter: Yeah, I mean, I think bring it back to the Fed and inflation, that really is the key story. On the growth side of things, things are holding up. We think the labor market is fine but not overheating, and so the whole story driving what the Fed's going to do comes down to inflation, like you said. So look, we expect, like the market does, another hike by the Fed in December.
    We're looking for another hike in March. The market's gonna debate are they gonna slip another one in in January. But we don't think so. We think we've got two more hikes from here, December and March, and then that's it. What will it take for that forecast to come true? It's gonna mean that our inflation forecast also has to come true, which is to say firm inflation now, but no clear signs for an acceleration from here.
    Because if things really pick up from here, then that January hike that the market's talking about might come true. It also means, though, that our forecast that Q1 is the peak of inflation in the United States and then it's a downward trend after that, that has to come true as well. Otherwise, it's entirely conceivable that the Fed would put in another hike after March, maybe in June, because they really want that assurance that inflation is coming down.
    Serena Tang: And how you framed it just now, I think, is the important thing, right? What markets are pricing in versus our expectations. In which case, what is your most out-of-consensus view on the global economy in 2027?
    Seth Carpenter: So I would say, you know, overall I don't know that we're wildly out of consensus anywhere. I would say we're probably above consensus in terms of our forecast for US growth. We are building in continued strong aggregate demand, but we're also penciling in an increase in the growth rate of productivity, partly because we do think AI adoption is going on.
    So that's one place where we're out of consensus. And then I guess I would come back to our discussion about inflation and what it means for central banks. The market is going to be debating a lot how much central banks are going to hike, how soon inflation's going to abate. Our view is, you know, Q1 is about the peak, and after that things come down, and so central banks won't have to hike more than that.
    I would say if we're wrong, there are probably more paths to more rates from central banks and higher inflation than to lower. So I would say that's one place where I think our view maybe has a bit of tension with at least the way the market's trying to price things.
    Serena Tang: Now, you've talked a lot about the base case. What are some of the alternate scenarios you see for the global economy?
    Seth Carpenter: Yeah, I personally think it's critical to come into any round, forecasting round with a base case. But that only gets you so far. You really have to ask yourself, "How could we be wrong?" And so what we tried to do was to sketch out four alternate scenarios that have some of the key risks that we think are there in the economy and that we're talking to clients about in markets.
    So in terms of a faster growth scenario, there really are two key scenarios that we tried to analyze. One demand, demand for CapEx, demand for consumer spending, especially in the United States, where demand overall is just stronger than we think, and that outcome leads to faster growth, but it also leads to much higher inflation.
    And so in response to that, the Fed and other developed market central banks are going to have to raise interest rates more and maybe to the same peaks that we saw in the last hiking cycle coming off of the COVID inflation. On the other hand, we're trying to figure out how is AI adoption happening?
    How much can productivity pick up? And so we also thought about a faster growth scenario where it's mostly driven by faster aggregate supply, that is, the productivity picks up faster. And the big difference there is that you're able to get faster growth without the same kind of inflationary pressures.
    Now, central banks everywhere are going to see that, and the first thing they see is faster growth, Anytime you have faster growth from productivity, anytime the underlying potential growth rate of the economy is faster, it tends to mean that the neutral equilibrium interest rate is actually higher, and so you could get slightly higher interest rates than under the baseline, even though inflation is well-behaved.
    Now, We, we are pretty constructive, and we do think there's probably more upside risk than downside risk, but we can't bury our heads in the sand. And so one version of the world is that the oil price shock that we've seen comes back, and we have oil prices going up a lot.
    Central banks will see that, and they'll have to react to that. And the way that AI CapEx build-out is driving all of the growth right now, question that we get from clients a lot is: What would happen if that fell short of your expectations?
    And I think that's worth thinking about too, because you have a combination of the direct spending, the direct effect of this build-out that's leading to more GDP, more growth, more exports from East Asia. But you also have an indirect effect, which is this whole phenomenon has driven up asset prices, which has given households more wealth, which has allowed strong spending to continue.
    And so if those factors both went away, you would have a negative effect on the direct channel of spending and an additional drag on the economy from the indirect wealth channel. And for us, that means a slowdown. Probably not a recession. like I said, we're pretty constructive about what's going on with AI anyway, but one would have to at least consider what would happen if these spending plans fall short of our current forecast.
    Serena Tang: And of course, all of those risk scenarios just means The range of outcome for risk assets is unusually wide.
    Seth Carpenter: Yeah, I think that's right.
    There is a huge amount of uncertainty here. We are in uncharted territory in so many ways. The AI phenomenon all by itself is just a brand-new situation for everybody in markets. But energy prices and everything that's going on in that space, there's still a lot of uncertainty.
    We've had a series of these supply shocks and how that may or may not get embedded into inflation psychology in the way that price setters and price takers react to that inflation, that's uncertain as well. So I, I really think it is fair to say there's a very broad range of possible outcome here, and investors around the world are going to have to pay lots of attention.
    Serena Tang: And of course, we're going to be talking about that in our next podcast. Seth, thanks for taking the time to talk.
    Seth Carpenter: Serena, it is always great to sit down with you and talk through these issues. I'm gonna turn the tables on you tomorrow and ask you about markets.
    Serena Tang: Of course. And thanks to our listeners for joining. Please be sure to tune in to the second half of this conversation tomorrow to hear how we're thinking about investment strategy in the year ahead.
    If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.
  • Thoughts on the Market

    Can AI Chip Demand Outrun the Power Crunch?

    13.11.2026 | 12 min.
    The U.S. midterm results could lead to policy changes that worsen the power bottleneck for U.S. data centers. Meanwhile, the outlook for AI chips remains bullish. Our specialists discuss potential challenges and opportunities in the AI buildout.
    Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.

    ----- Transcript -----

    Tom Wigg: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Tom Wigg from Morgan Stanley's TMT Specialty Sales. I'm joined by Joe Moore, U.S. Semiconductors Analyst, and Stephen Byrd, Global Head of Thematic Research.
    Today, the disconnect between the AI power gigawatt shortfall, especially post-midterms, and a bullish outlook on AI semiconductors.
    It's Friday, November 13th at 10am in New York.
    Morgan Stanley already estimated a 30 gigawatt shortfall between now and 2028, and you revised that higher after the midterm. So maybe talk about our estimates, where they've gone now? And how you're thinking about this whole question around, you know, really Texas is kind of the ground zero for this conversation.
    But it kinda happened in Ohio and other places as well…
    Stephen Byrd: Absolutely. Yeah. I mean, obviously the election caused a lot of investors to focus on the political challenges, but this is not new per se. So, we've been talking about people, power, and politics being real bottlenecks on the ability to build out data centers in the United States.
    Now, that creates a lot of incentive elsewhere around the world to build. But in the U.S., we have a lot of challenges in terms of the build-out. The election really underscored the importance of addressing data center concerns. A bunch of voters expressed concerns with data center development.
    And to be fair, I think that's warranted in some cases because some of these data centers really are developed in ways that may not work for local communities. So, I understand the concern. Mathematically, what we essentially are looking at is that bottleneck getting larger in 2028 because of a couple of gubernatorial outcomes, Texas and Ohio being specific, where we think it's a delay.
    It's not a cancellation. We actually think there's a path to getting these data centers built. It's just going to take a little bit longer because of the processes that those new governors are going to want data center developers to go through. So, we go from kind of 30 gigawatts up into the mid-30s in terms of the shortage.
    But then in 2029, the deployment is much, much bigger. So, it is a relief valve, and in some ways – something Joe and I talk a lot about – helpful in some ways because this elongates that growth cycle as well.
    Tom Wigg: What are the offsets that we can get? You know, [be]cause some clients will talk about, you know, Louisiana now became the new Texas that everyone…
    Stephen Byrd: Yes.
    Tom Wigg: … is excited about, you know; still a red state. Some clients are talking about Asia, particularly Malaysia as a region where labor's cheaper, there's no permitting. You know, maybe we can get a lot more gigawatts online.
    Stephen Byrd: Mm-hmm. Yeah.
    Tom Wigg: Google recently signed a deal there. Behind the meter, still an option. Grid optimization, probably not something I understand. But I know you've been a power exec, so maybe you do.
    Stephen Byrd: Sure, sure.
    Tom Wigg: Do you think we can kinda cobble together enough power in other ways where maybe your shortfall is too conservative?
    Stephen Byrd: Yeah, I think there's a path where the shortfall is less than what we laid out, so let's go through all the options. But where there's a will and lots and lots of money and lots of innovation, there's often a solution.
    So, let's go through the categories. So, off grid we like a lot, and we put in a forecast of what we think can be done in the United States. The challenge is time – in the sense that engineering those solutions, getting the labor, getting the permits, all of that takes time.
    And an example, my home state of Virginia essentially outlawed on-site gas generation, in sort of anticipation that folks would go down this off-grid path. And they don't want to see those kinds of emissions.
    So, we are running into challenges. When we tally that up, it's not as much power as I think many bulls would like. Just – it's not a question of demand, it's a question of all those challenges that I just mentioned. But there could be bigger solutions over time.
    We have really good teams around the world that assess incremental demand and deployment. Just as you mentioned, Tom, Malaysia is one of those opportunities, though I would point to India, Thailand, a little bit in Japan, China.
    On the other hand, we have issues in other parts of the world. So, Norway now has a moratorium on data centers. We're running into some problems in Australia. We're running into some problems in the United Kingdom, where a big, proposed UK project was terminated because the utility couldn't provide grid access fast enough.
    So, it's a lot of puts and takes. When we add all this up, as of now, it's not enough to address the U.S. shortfall. But I would expect over time just more and more emphasis on getting solutions.
    Now, one thing I do want to say where I'm not bullish is grid optimization. So, it's a cool idea. But let me just briefly explain why I think there's more hype than reality to this.
    The idea is that the U.S. grid is actually only utilized on average, like, 50 percent of the time. Something like that, so there's clearly slack. The problem is that's not how a utility executive would look at the situation. Utilities manage the grid for the worst possible day or the worst possible situation. That would be a six-day winter storm, for example.
    During a six-day winter storm, demand is at the peak, and they expect some of their power plants to trip offline because of the cold conditions. So, they're going to manage their system assuming every data center developer is going to want to have power and everybody else will.
    So, the idea of being flexible and, and sort of filling in those gaps just doesn't work under the conservative mindset of a utility. So that part unfortunately I don't think is going to work.
    Tom Wigg: Got it. And then before I switch to Joe, maybe if you can just put your political hat on for a second. I know you spend a lot of time in D.C., so if you can play pundit. There's a difference between, you know, running for office in an election and actually governing.
    Stephen Byrd: Absolutely.
    Tom Wigg: So, some of the commentary post-election from the bulls has been, okay, you know, this blue wave happened. But these blue governors are still going to want economic activity in their state. And if the AI companies approach this with, you know, more community-oriented solutions. In terms of, you know, giving back, building a school, building a football stadium in West Texas, paying teachers more. Whatever it is, you know, there's a better way to do this. And that should get a lot of these things through.
    Is that your sense? Or is there something more against the data centers?
    Stephen Byrd: Yes. No, I think that is my sense, at least in some states. And this is really the genesis of our big buy the drop note; was we think this is a bit of a pause in terms of the pace of data center growth. It is not a cancellation, in terms of what we see, to your point.
    What I think we'll see is very smart approaches to developing data centers that work for all the constituents. Louisiana's a great example you mentioned earlier. We see projects where the developers are bankrolling new hospitals, pay raises for teachers and folks in police and fire service.
    And when you do it in the right way, I think you can get support and create economic activity. Look at Louisiana. When you look at all of the activity in Louisiana. Not just data centers, but other industrial activity. That magnitude rivals large nations, in terms of the amount of economic activity in the state. And that is so good from a fundamental economic health of the state.
    So, I do think there's a path. That's just going to take a little bit of time to work through.
    Tom Wigg: Yep. Let's talk to Joe. So, semis have been very controversial. We had this tough summer, another sell-off in October. One of the bear cases is this power shortfall.
    How is everything still so tight in semis from a supply demand standpoint when power is getting worse? And are we setting ourselves up for an oversupply situation where there's just no place to put all these chips that we're building?
    Joe Moore: Yeah. So, I think for 2027, it's not just staying tight. It's getting tighter. Like, all of the component shortages are severe. You've had multiple CEOs from hyperscalers say memory is their biggest problem, not land power shell in the short term.
    That doesn't mean land power shell's not becoming a bigger and bigger focus. So, we have to see what's going to happen with each individual project. I think the nice thing about selling ubiquitous compute is you can have three people that don't have a place to put it and five other people who want the thing that they didn't have a place to put it.
    So, I think it's still very strong into 2028. I would kind of argue that what we're hearing is it's very challenging. If you sort of take something in Texas offline, you take something in Ohio offline that we thought we had; we have to really scramble and find another place to put it.
    I think there's still the view from the people we talk to is that it's not going to slow us down. We'll find a way. And talking to Stephen, it's sort of hard to see exactly what that way may be. A lot of the international stuff may be an option. We'll have to see what the economy looks like.
    In a weaker economy, I think you're much more prone to allow people to build data centers [be]cause it's jobs and things like that. So, we have… There's a lot of unknowns out to [20]28, and any semiconductor analyst talking two years out is hard to say.
    But Stephen made this point. This is a duration kind of trade now, and we know it's really good. Other bottlenecks are a big risk that we need to contemplate. And I mean, the interesting thing about memory too is consumers – PC, smartphone, you know, those businesses are very weak.
    And every quarter we've gone through this where the PC numbers aren't that good and there's inventory and... But the fulfillment at the data centers is really low, like 50 percent. And so that's the true north in all of this. And what that does to me for memory is it keeps the stocks very range bound. But look at the range.
    I mean, we're down 60 percent, 70 percent. And we're trading at like three times earnings. So, any kind of sustainability to some of these stocks and, you know, you'll be able to buy back half the company in two years. So, I'm pretty bullish on all of it.
    And I think – and none of that is discounting anything that Stephen is saying.
    And I think it does reframe a little bit the competitive dynamic. Because, you know, am I taking my restricted land power shell and using it on something that may or may not work? We'll see. But I think the overall ecosystem is still very good, and I think the kinds of arguments you're hearing now is that [20]27's good.
    What about '28? We heard that at the end of [20]24, [20]25. Eventually it'll be right. Eventually there will be a year where you're like, "Okay, it is actually slowing down in that year." It just doesn't feel that way to me. And given that the market is basically saying now that it does, we're being valued as it slows in [20]28. And you know, I think that visibility's going to still be good.
    Tom Wigg: So, like you said, you know, the, the stocks are now essentially baking in 2028 rolling over. You think that's too bearish. When does the market appreciate that? Will we get some sort of 2028 visibility in the middle of next year. Kinda like we did this year? Do we need a new AI use case to make people think about, you know, incremental tightening in the supply chain?
    Joe Moore: Yeah.
    Tom Wigg: Is there more clarity on AI financing? One of the above, all of the above? Like, how do you think about that? And like, you know, when you looked at past cycles, I know this is sort of unprecedented, but like how does that play out?
    Joe Moore: Yeah, I think it's very... You know, the worst case is it's just kind of a grind, and we have to prove that [20]28 is good because we have 12-month lead times, and 12 months from now we think [20]28 is good.
    And quarter by quarter we continue to feel okay about it. But we are going to learn a lot about how these models are used. We're starting to see, you know, the companies that are going to come public now are the ones who actually… There's actually cost of sales for them. You know, we've seen cloud service providers doing great, but somebody's renting from them.
    So, I think getting some visibility into the economics of how AI's actually getting used will be really important. You know, maybe bad, I don't know. But I think that's what will help us get that visibility. Certainly the confidence. I mean, the Silicon Valley… The dissonance between Silicon Valley optimism and Wall Street pessimism has never been this wide.
    And it's not even; Wall Street pessimism is the wrong word [be]cause I feel like, you know, 60 percent of the people will be bullish, but they're very easily swayed by a couple people who pitch the -- They know things are falling apart. And so, there's like a not… The conviction isn't there that maybe you'd like to see.
    I think that conviction can come back very quickly in the right sort of economic circumstance. I don't think guiding to 2030 is the answer when you're in a duration trade, you know. That just creates risk. It makes it hard for the stocks to move forward because you're already guiding for a 75 percent four-year CAGR.
    I need to each and every quarter, you know, validate that. But I think in general, just put up numbers and the world will come around to if it's sustainable or not. I mean, the market's smart and the market will decide.
    Tom Wigg: Got it. Stephen, Joe, thanks for speaking with me today. And thanks for listening. If you enjoyed the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen. And share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.
  • Thoughts on the Market

    From AI to Air-Conditioning: The Power Boom in Asia

    12.11.2026 | 4 min.
    Our Asia Energy analyst Mayank Maheshwari discusses how AI, new factories and cooling systems are boosting electricity demand in Asia and reshaping local power structure.
    Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.

    ----- Transcript -----

    Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Mayank Maheshwari, Morgan Stanley’s Asia Energy analyst.
    Today – why power thematic is moving beyond AI.
    It’s Thursday, November 12th, at 10am in Singapore.
    Whenever I have a conversation on power, it is mostly thought of as a story about AI. But the electrification super cycle is much broader than just AI. Consensus is underestimating how much power the world will need by the end of the decade.
    We think global electricity use could reach nearly 36 trillion units by 2030, 15 percent above current market estimates. Outside China, that could reach 23 trillion units, with Asia’s demand growing 20 percent faster than in the U.S.
    For years, the focus was on the electricity needed by data centers and semiconductor factories. That need is still rising, but AI-related demand is only about a quarter of incremental power demand. New industrial projects and air conditioning are now adding to the pressure.
    Not surprisingly, AI adoption is a big reason that data center demand keeps making the problem especially acute. A conventional chatbot may answer a question with one request. An AI agent can work through a task by searching for information, using software, and checking its results. That process requires more computing power, even as the cost of each unit of computing falls.
    AI agents could drive a 1.6-fold increase in global power consumption by 2030. That raises a practical question: where will the new data centers and semiconductor factories be built, and how will they get the electricity they need? Some of that investment may shift to Asia because the U.S. cannot add power capacity quickly enough.
    The shift could be sizable. We estimate that Asia could absorb about 15 gigawatts of additional demand from projects linked to the U.S. Asia may need 84 gigawatts of data center capacity by 2030, roughly four times that of 2025 levels. Thailand has already seen $25 billion in data center investment commitments, while Singapore, India, and Japan are seeing stronger demand coming through for power across various U.S. hyperscalers.
    But AI is just the beginning of a global electricity supercycle. Cooling is another major source of demand. Air conditioning could require as much electricity as data centers by 2030. In India, cooling can account for up to 40 percent of peak power use during the summer. Taken together, that raises the bigger question: where will all this electricity come from?
    About 60 percent of Asia’s data center capacity currently runs on coal and natural gas. We expect gas generation outside China to increase by around 19 gigawatts between 2025 and 2030, supporting roughly 20 million tonnes a year of LNG imports into Asia.
    Renewables and batteries will be part of the answer, but the grid will need to expand as well. Asia could require about $1 trillion of new grid investments through 2030. In some markets, data centers are being encouraged to build their own power because the central grid cannot connect them quickly enough.
    The strain is already showing up in power prices. Global power prices rose about 20 percent year-on-year in 2026, and we expect the gap between electricity prices and generation costs to widen by around 15 percent by 2028.
    Investors may be underestimating how much electricity Asia will need, and how broadly that demand will spread beyond data centers. That could create more value for the owners of reliable power generation companies as well as grid infrastructure than for the companies that simply supply equipment. We believe the most attractive power markets are India, Malaysia, Australia, and the U.S.
    Thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.
  • Thoughts on the Market

    Midterms Could Delay the AI Buildout, Not Derail It

    11.11.2026 | 4 min.
    Concerns over electricity bills and water use are turning into political action. Our Head of Public Policy Research Ariana Salvatore breaks down what the midterms mean for the data center pipeline, hyperscaler CapEx and investors.
    Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.

    ----- Transcript -----

    Ariana Salvatore: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Ariana Salvatore, Head of Public Policy Research at Morgan Stanley.
    Today, the U.S. midterm elections and what they could mean for the build-out of AI infrastructure.
    It's Wednesday, November 11th at 10am in New York.
    Growing concerns around electricity bills, water consumption, and the economic benefits of data centers have translated into meaningful political opposition. And last week's results reinforce just how salient those issues were in voters' decision-making.
    But what are the practical implications for the build-out?
    We think that the midterms were actually more likely to change where data centers get built, when they come online, and what cost is associated with doing so, rather than whether they get built at all.
    We've been flagging political opposition to data centers as a risk for some time, and the election results reinforce our view that this is largely a state-by-state and even project-by-project issue.
    Let's take a few examples.
    Texas, we think, was the most consequential result. Governor-elect Hinojosa has proposed pausing new data center approvals until stronger protections are in place. In Ohio, Governor-elect Acton has proposed a conditional moratorium. And in Georgia, we see policy action as more incremental, with greater scrutiny of construction approvals and how electricity infrastructure costs are allocated.
    So altogether, these developments point to a broader shift in political and community support. The opposition is increasingly bipartisan, but the friction remains primarily local.
    At the federal level, we think the government retains an accommodative posture, just given the importance of AI as national security infrastructure and the likelihood of a presidential veto on restrictive legislation.
    But what does this mean for the build-out?
    My colleague Cameron McVey and his team estimate that approximately five gigawatts of U.S. data center projects, or roughly 20 percent of the 2028 pipeline, will shift into 2029.
    We think 2027 construction will likely remain unaffected because projects are generally already permitted or underway. As a result, U.S. data center capacity additions are projected to be roughly flat in 2028 before growing nearly 40 percent in 2029.
    That feeds into our tech analyst view led by Brian Nowak that hyperscaler CapEx next year should remain unchanged at approximately $1.6 trillion and [$]1.8 trillion in 2028. So, our base case is a delay, not a fundamental reduction in investment. In fact, we think this could actually extend the duration of the AI investment cycle, and it reinforces an existing constraint – access to electricity.
    We've been highlighting the three Ps that are bottlenecks here: people, power, and politics. Stephen Byrd and our Powering AI team now estimate a 44-gigawatt shortfall in U.S. data center power through 2028, representing roughly 38 percent of projected demand. That means that the critical bottleneck is increasingly shifting from computing equipment to power data center facilities.
    And that has several investment implications.
    First, the largest and best-capitalized hyperscalers are particularly well-positioned. These are the companies that have a line of sight to 25 to 50 percent return on investment. They also have flexibility to redirect their investment, they can absorb higher costs, and they can improve computing efficiency.
    Second, we see opportunities in existing power-secured facilities and technologies that help developers access electricity more quickly. But there are also risks to the supply chain. A slower build-out in 2028 could mean weaker equipment orders, inventory accumulation, and pressure on supplier margins, even if the underlying AI demand remains strong
    Lastly, as my colleagues in credit like Vishwas Patkar have been highlighting, the financing environment is likely to become more differentiated under the surface. We continue to expect substantial AI-related borrowing in 2027 led by the hyperscalers. But new construction financing will face greater scrutiny around permitting, power availability, and execution. By contrast, existing data centers with stable cash flows could benefit from increased scarcity and stronger lease pricing.
    And finally, our equity strategy colleagues see investment opportunities broadening beyond infrastructure to companies actually adopting AI.
    So, the through line here is that midterms have introduced real political and execution risk. But we think that these constraints are more likely to reshape and actually prolong the AI investment cycle than derail it. And with the recent market weakness reflecting a more pessimistic outcome, we see selective opportunities across the AI value chain.
    Thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.
  • Thoughts on the Market

    Big Political Shift, Narrow Economic Impact

    10.11.2026 | 4 min.
    What do the midterm elections mean for the U.S. economic outlook? Arunima Sinha, from our U.S. and Global Economics teams, examines the potential implications for policy, legislation and the broader economic landscape.
    Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.

    ----- Transcript -----

    Arunima Sinha: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Arunima Sinha from Morgan Stanley's U.S. and Global Economics teams.
    Today, I'll talk about our read-throughs from the midterm elections for the macroeconomic backdrop.
    It's Tuesday, November 11th at 10am in New York.
    Elections have consequences, but the economic implications are not always immediate or broad. There's no denying that last week's U.S. midterm elections brought sweeping change to the Congress and a number of states. And the correlation isn't causation caveat aside; the market has moved a lot in the wake of the results.
    But we still think that the near-term macro impulse is narrower. While Democrats swept the legislative branch at the federal level, the White House is of course unchanged. Because the president has authority over tariffs, immigration, and much of the regulatory agenda; legislative change, if it comes, might be a marginal adjustment to some domestic spending, but not the key policy theme for macro.
    For AI, and particularly in Texas and Ohio – where the executive branch turned over to the Democrats, but the legislatures did not – state and local governments matter. Whereas the election was necessarily partisan, some Republicans ran on anti-data center platforms. AI policy in the United States is still evolving. There is a risk that some projects could slip from 2028 to 2029, but we remain constructive on the overall build-out.
    The trade readthrough is similar. U.S. AI imports have supported export growth across Asia, which makes Asian trade data an important lead indicator for the investment cycle. The election may slow U.S. capacity additions in some places, but it does not point to a broad reversal of the build-out.
    The more likely outcome is a more conditional cycle. Projects proceed where power, permitting and local politics are supportive; and capacity migrates away from places where approval gets harder. That changes the geography of investment more than the direction of demand. Indeed, the shift from microchips to broader Korean exports is likely an early signal that trade flows next year become less concentrated and broader based.
    Taiwan and Korea remain central to chips and memory, but Mexico is important for server assembly. Southeast Asia is gaining exposure in networking and optical equipment, and Japan and Europe are increasingly involved in semiconductor equipment, turbines, transformers, and other power infrastructure. At the same time, a larger power shortfall in the U.S. could allow demand to spill over to Asia and EMEA, accelerating a dynamic our equity analysts have already been highlighting.
    Fiscal policy is the more direct federal channel. But this is not primarily a deficit story. A Democratic majority could delay or soften the scheduled SNAP and Medicaid cuts, but the growth effect would be small. Even a full rollback of the measures due to take effect in January 2027 would add less than half a percentage point to real spending growth.
    Nor do we expect a material change in the deficit. Even with these SNAP and Medicaid cuts fully reversed, we think deficits stay around 6 percent of the GDP. And despite the concern about deficit risks, U.S. debt looks more sustainable on a five-year horizon than it did a year ago, due to upside surprises and nominal growth.
    The bottom line is one of scope. The political change may well be meaningful and have implications for AI permitting, fiscal negotiations, and therefore differentiated implications across asset classes. But the near-term aggregate economic channels are narrower than the political headline.
    Tariffs, immigration, and much of the deregulatory agenda remain largely under executive authority. So, the election mainly shifts the probability distribution around a limited set of legislative and local policy outcomes.
    Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.
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